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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 930730-CA
vs.
JOHN LEE SALING,
Defendant-Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal
because it is an appeal in a criminal case, not involving a firstdegree or capital felony.

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(f).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Should the lower court have suppressed

evidence

obtained pursuant to a warrantless entry and search of Defendant's
motel room?

Since neither party is disputing the acts by the court

in determining not to suppress the evidence, this court should
review the legal conclusions based upon a correction of error
standard and need accord no deference to the trial court.

State

v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270-71 & n. 11 (Utah 1993); State v.
Strickley, 844 P.2d at 979, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1.
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath
or
affirmation,
in
particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U. S. Const. Amend. 4.
2.
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not abe violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
Utah Const. Art. I, Section 14.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This

is

a

criminal

action

arising

from

Defendant's

alleged criminal mischief, theft and possession of burglary tools,
all misdemeanors.
B.

Course of Proceedings
Subsequent to being charged with the above offenses,

Defendant made a motion to suppress certain evidence

obtained

through the search of his motel room at the Abby Inn Motel in Cedar
City, Utah on July 5, 1993.
court

denied

the motion

Upon hearing the evidence, the lower

to

suppress.

Defendant

then made

a

conditional plea of guilty based upon the court's ruling.
C.

Disposition at Trial Court
Based

upon

Defendant's

conditional

plea,

the

lower

entered a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, sentencing Defendant
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to serve one year in the Iron County Jail, on the criminal mischief
charge and six months each on the theft and possession of burglary
tools charges, all to run concurrently, and to pay restitution in
the total sum of $981.58.
D.

Statement of Facts
On the late night or early morning of July 4-5, 1993, a

soda pop vending machine was broken into and money stolen at the
Abbey Inn Motel in Cedar City, Utah. Defendant and his mother were
guests of the Abbey
information

Inn on that night and Defendant provided

to the police

authorities regarding

the

aforesaid

incident. (Tr. 34-35).
Between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on the
morning of July 5, 1993, a Cedar City Police officer knocked on the
door of Defendant's room, ostensibly to obtain further information
regarding the incident.
mother, the officer

Being unable to rouse Defendant or his

ultimately

elicited

the aid of the motel

manager, Mr. Brian Kreitzer, who also attempted to rouse Defendant
or his mother, both by knocking on the door and by attempting to
call the room.

Although there may be some dispute about whether

time of entry was before or after the 11:00 a.m. checkout, both the
officer and Mr. Kreitzer testified that Mr. Kreitzer obtained a
pass key to bypass the dead bolt security locking system of the
motel

room

and

to open the door to the room.

Mr. Kreitzer

justified this action on the basis that the check out time was
11:00 a.m. and he believed that the Defendant and his mother had
exited the room by other means.

Defendant's mother was an invalid
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and required the use of a wheel chair. (Tr. 34, 36, 48-49).
Mr. Kreitzer further testified that a locked deadbolt,
as was the case here, normally indicated that a customer was still
in the room.

He further indicated that he was suspicious about

Defendant when he obtained the pass key to bypass the deadbolt.
Finally, Mr. Kreitzer testified that although it was past the 11:00
a.m. regular checkout time it was still the Motel's policy to
maintain privacy and security for its customers. (Tr. 68-71).
Upon gaining access to the room, Defendant ultimately
came

to

the

door.

While

standing

near

the

door

talking

to

Defendant, the officer and/or Mr. Kreitzer observed a tire iron
near Defendant's bed and a duffel bag, which was partially opened.
The officer asked Defendant for permission to search the duffel
bag, which was given.
bag,

While observing the contents of the duffel

the officer and Mr. Kreitzer observed parts believed to be

from the vending machine, which were seized.

(Tr. 38-42, 51-53).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There

were

no

exigent

circumstances

warrantless entry of the Defendant's motel room.

to

justify

the

Consequently all

the evidence obtained as consequence of the unlawful entry should
have been suppressed by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE
WARRANTLESS
ENTRY
AND
SEARCH
DEFENDANT'S MOTEL ROOM WAS UNJUSTIFIED

OF

Although there is some dispute as to when the officer and

4

manager entered Defendant's motel room, the trial court found that
the search occurred at or shortly after 11:00 a.m., which was the
motel's regular checkout time.

The first issue, then, is whether

there was actually a "search" of the room.

In Boyd v. United

States, the United States Supreme Court defined a "search" as
contemplated under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as "the
invasion of [the] indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property."
616,

630 (1883).

Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.

The Court has also held that a person has a

reasonable privacy expectation in a hotel room, and, therefore, an
entry into the same, without a warrant, constitutes a search.
Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966).

See also, United

States v. Windsor, 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 1988).
In the instant case, although the checkout time may have
passed, Defendant still maintained an expectation of privacy and
security.
motel

Indeed, the motel manager stated that as a policy the

seeks to maintain the privacy of its guests even after

checkout time.

Defendant demonstrated this desire for privacy by

securing the dead bolt in the room.

The motel manager stated that

when the deadbolt was secured it was his usual expectation that
someone would be in the room.

He claims he deviated from this

expectation in this case, believing that Defendant may have left
the room through a window, because he was "suspicious" of the
Defendant. Of course, such suspicions, if true, were unreasonable,
since Defendant's mother, who was also in the room, was an invalid,
confined to a wheelchair.
5

The fact that Defendant failed to answer the telephone,
likewise is not evidence of his lack of expectation of privacy.
On the contrary, it demonstrates the opposite: that he did not wish
to be

contacted

or to

communicate

with

anyone

and wanted

to

maintain his "privacy".
A second issue is whether the entry into the motel room
was a private act by the motel manager.

Of course, it is only

governmental acts that subject evidence to exclusion under the
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment "is wholly inapplicable f to
search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the
participation and knowledge of any governmental official ! ". United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 115 (1984) (quoting with approval
Walter v. United States, 447 U. S. 649, 662 (1980)(Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "[w]hen
a governmental official affirmatively facilitates or encourages an
unreasonable search performed by a private person, a constitutional
violation occurs".

Specht v. Jenson, 832 F.2d 515-16, 523 (10th

Cir.),rehfg granted in part en banc, 837 F.2d 940 and remanded on
reh f g en banc, 853 F.2d 805 (1987).
In

this

case,

it

appears

that

the

police

officer

initially attempted to contact Defendant by knocking on the door
of Defendant's motel room.

After being unsuccessful, rather than

seeking to obtain a warrant, the officer simply contacted the
manager and elicited his aid in gaining entry into the motel room.

6

When the entry was accomplished, both the officer and the motel
manager were present.
encouraged

the

Accordingly, since the officer not only

unlawful

entry

by

the

motel

manager,

but

specifically requested it, the entry into the Defendant's motel
room was governmental.
Having established that the entry into Defendant's motel
room was a "governmental search" within the contemplation of the
Fourth

Amendment,

circumstances

the

next

justifying

the

question
entry

is

whether

without

a

there

warrant.

were
A

warrantless search is per se unreasonable absent an appropriate
exception.

The only possible exception applicable here is what

is known as exigent circumstances.

The burden is upon the State

to demonstrate those exigent circumstances.

Welsh v. Wisconsin,

466 U. S. 740, 748-50 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573,
585-90 (1980);

Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).

In State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court has adopted the above-stated general rule and has
stated the following with regard to exigent circumstances:
Generally, exigency does not evolve from one
individual fact.
Instead, there is often a
mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is
itself sufficient. Our task is to review the
totality of the facts and circumstances of the
particular case to determine if the finding of
exigency is proper.
Id. at 1258.
In the instant case, the State has failed to produce any
single facts, let alone a "mosaic" of facts that would support
exigent circumstances.

The case at bar is more similar to the case
7

of State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In Beavers, Defendant allegedly committed a burglary and
theft

of

clothing

from

two retail

stores.

The

allegedly stored at the apartment of one Nichols.

clothing
The

was

following

day, the manager of Nichols1 apartment complex telephoned police
officers stating that he had overheard a loud argument coming from
Nichols1 apartment.

Officers responded to the scene and found the

latching mechanism on the door to be broken and that the door was
open a few inches. Apparently Nichols was not home, but the police
overheard a conversation near the slightly open door between two
occupants of the apartment about the value of coats.

There was no

evidence that the occupants were not present as guests of the
tenant.

One of the occupants, Davis, then began to leave the

apartment and stepped through the door carrying a coat.

When he

saw the officers, he uttered an expletive and immediately stepped
back across the threshold into the apartment.

One of the officers

reached across the threshold, grabbed Davis, flipped his legs out
from under him and forced him into a prone position on the floor.
Then the same officer observed another occupant "fumbling with a
pile of clothes on the floor while the other two persons fled from
sight."

Fearing for the safety of himself and the other officers,

the first officer called to the other officers present, who entered
the apartment with their guns drawn.

Subsequent to the entry by

the

the

officers,

and

while

checking

apartment

for

other

individuals, they observed new coats hanging in closets, which were
ultimately seized as evidence.

Jj3. at 10-11.
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The lower court denied a Motion to Suppress the evidence
obtained in the apartment, but this court reversed, holding that
the entry into the apartment was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution.

With regard to whether the entry was

reasonable because of exigent circumstances, this court found that
there were no justifiable exigent circumstances. Specifically, the
court found that there was no reasonable risk that the evidence
(the numerous coats) could be destroyed.

Similarly, there was no

risk of the suspects escaping when the apartment was on a second
floor.

Finally, there was not evidence of a substantial risk of

harm to the officers, because there was no reasonable belief that
any of the occupants had any weapons.

Id.

at 18-19.

In the instant case, there was likewise no evidence that
the evidence, if any, would be destroyed, especially in light of
the items that were found.

Defendant simply had no means to

destroy the evidence in the motel room.

Similarly, there was no

evidence that Defendant was armed or otherwise dangerous and the
officer and manager certainly did not indicate such.

It is highly

unlikely that the officer would have allowed the manager to enter
the room with him, if he thought there was a danger to himself or
others.

There is, some evidence presented by the State that there

was concern

that Defendant might

flee.

But, again, that

is

inconsistent with the fact that Defendant had an invalid mother who
was confined to a wheelchair.
In Beavers the State also claimed that the search was
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reasonable because of the suspicion roused in the officers as they
listened to the conversation in the apartment.

This exception is

based upon the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-23 (1968).
This court specifically held that Terry, which involved a stop of
an automobile, does not apply to warrantless entry of a home and
stated that "police canfnot] enter a dwelling without a warrant on
the basis of reasonable suspicion.

An extension of the Terry

doctrine to warrantless entries of private premises is contrary to
Fourth Amendment principles."

Beavers, 859 P.2d at 17.

In the instant case, the manager and the police officer
both testified that they were suspicious about Defendant and his
possible involvement
unreasonable.

in the alleged crime.

Such suspicion is

Defendant was no different than any other motel

patron who wished to secure his room against entry by a maid, other
motel personnel or another person.

Moreover every person has the

fundamental right not to answer knocks at his door or the ring of
his telephone.

It assumes too much to claim that simply failing

to answer the door or telephone means that a person has probably
been involved in criminal activity.

Nevertheless, under Beavers,

even if such suspicions were reasonable, it did not justify the
entry into Defendant's motel room without a warrant.
Finally, because the mere entry into the motel room was
constitutionally improper, as in Beavers, any evidence obtained
after the entry, should have been excluded, including the evidence
obtained from Defendant's duffel bag, despite his consent for the
officer to search it.

All such evidence constitutes the "fruit of
10

a poisonous tree".

Beavers, 859 P.2d at 19.
CONCLUSION

Because there were not exigent circumstances justifying
the warrantless entry of Defendant's motel room, the evidence
obtained through such "search" should have been suppressed by the
lower court.

Therefore, this court should reverse the judgment of

the lower court and remand the same to the trial court for the
entry of a dismissal of all charges against Defendant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of May, 1994.

FLOWWHOLM

Attorney f o r
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*

Defendant/Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Ms, Jan Graham,
Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114, this 16th day of May, 1994, first class postage fully
prepaid.
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SCOTT M. BURNS - USB #4283
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND
COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

JOHN LEE SALING,
Defendant.

Criminal No. 931500422
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite

The Defendant, JOHN LEE SALING, having entered pleas of guilty to the offenses of
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class A Misdemeanor; THEFT, a Class B Misdemeanor; and
POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS, a Class B Misdemearfbr; on October 5, 1993, and the
Court having accepted said pleas and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a Presentence
Investigation Report, and after said report was prepared and presented to the1 Court, the Court
having called the matter on for sentencing on November 15, 1993, in Cedar City, Utah, and the
Defendant having appeared before the Court in person together with his attorney of record, Floyd
W Holm, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M.
Burns, and the Court having reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and thereafter having
heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Iron County Attorney, and the Court

being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and
Commitment, to wit:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, JOHN
LEE SALING, has been convicted of the offenses of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class A
Misdemeanor; THEFT, a Class B Misdemeanor; and POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS,
a Class B Misdemeanor; and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say
in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary
being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and
convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, JOHN LEE SALING, and pursuant to his
conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class A Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term
of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a period of one (1) year, and the Defendant is hereby
placed in the custody of the Iron County Sheriff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, JOHN LEE SALING, and pursuant to
his conviction of THEFT, a Class B Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of incarceration
in the Iron County Jail for a period of six (6) months.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, JOHN LEE SALING, and pursuant to
his conviction of POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS, a Class B Misdemeanor, is hereby
sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a period of six (6) months.

-2-

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the one-year term of incarceration and the two (2) 6month terms of incarceration shall be served concurrently.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant pay restitution to Coca-Cola Bottling
Company in the amount of seven hundred twenty-two dollars ($722.00) and to the Abbey Inn of
Cedar City, Utah, in the amount of two hundred fifty-nine dollars and fifty-eight cents ($259.58),
for a total restitution amount of nine hundred eighty-one dollars and fifty-eight cents ($981.58).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant be evaluated for an appropriate substance
abuse program.

In the event he is diagnosed as having a substance abuse problem and an

appropriate program is located, the matter shall be brought back before the Court for review and
for entry of further orders by the Court.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, JOHN LEE SALING, and
deliver him to the Iron County AJtah State Correctional Facility, there to be kept and confined in
accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.
DATED this

11

day of November, 1993.
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CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, LINDA WILLIAMSON, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the
original Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs John Lee
Saline, Criminal No. 931500422, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of
Utah, this _ _ _ 2 u £ _ a a y of November, 1993.

UNPA W1U-IAM8QN
LINDA WILLIAMSON
District Court Clerk

By: 7-/I4-/1
Deputy District Court Clerk
*

r

^wyrv ,)f^

;

r

-4-

AMJftlNlJlVlJ&lYJL'd

IU

ini^

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
A M E N D M E N T IV
[ U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no W a r r a n t s shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec. 14.

[ U n r e a s o n a b l e searches forbidden —
I s s u a n c e of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
w a r r a n t shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
189€
seized.
78-2a-3. C o u r t of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands. Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the stale or other local agencies; and
(h) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degTee or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;

